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ABSTRACT The ageing phenomenon of negative bias temperature instability (NBTI) continues to challenge the dynamic 
thermal management of modern FPGAs. Increased transistor density leads to thermal accumulation and propagates higher and 
non-uniform temperature variations across the FPGA. This aggravates the impact of NBTI on key PMOS transistor parameters 
such as threshold voltage and drain current. Where it ages the transistors, with a successive reduction in FPGA lifetime and 
reliability, it also challenges its security. The ingress of threshold voltage-triggered hardware Trojan, a stealthy and malicious 
electronic circuit, in the modern FPGA, is one such potential threat that could exploit NBTI and severely affect its performance. 
The development of an effective and efficient countermeasure against it is, therefore, highly critical. Accordingly, we present 
a comprehensive FPGA security scheme, comprising novel elements of hardware Trojan infection, detection, and mitigation, 
to protect FPGA applications against the hardware Trojan. Built around the threat model of a naval warship’s integrated self-
protection system (ISPS), we propose a threshold voltage-triggered hardware Trojan that operates in a threshold voltage region 
of 0.45V to 0.998V, consuming ultra-low power (10.5nW), and remaining stealthy with an area overhead as low as 1.5% for 
a 28 nm technology node. The hardware Trojan detection sub-scheme provides a unique lightweight threshold voltage-aware 
sensor with a detection sensitivity of 0.251mV/nA. With fixed and dynamic ring oscillator-based sensor segments, the precise 
measurement of frequency and delay variations in response to shifts in the threshold voltage of a PMOS transistor is also 
proposed. Finally, the FPGA security scheme is reinforced with an online transistor dynamic scaling (OTDS) to mitigate the 
impact of hardware Trojan through run-time tolerant circuitry capable of identifying critical gates with worst-case drain current 
degradation. 
 
INDEX TERMS Ageing Mechanism, Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), Hardware Trojan, Negative 
Bias Temperature Instability (NBTI), Propagation Delay, Reliability, Threshold Voltage. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A modern FPGA is not merely an emulator but a hardware 
accelerator with heterogenous hard IP cores, such as 
complex memory blocks, multiple processors, and DSP 
blocks. Systems on chip (SoC), network on chip (NoC), and 
adaptive compute acceleration platform (ACAP) are the 
significant performance and functional enhancements of 
FPGAs, that have been made possible due to the continual 
shrinking of transistor sizes down to the scales of 10 nm and 
below. The performance benefits, however, are limited by 
power and timing closures. Similarly, the geometric 
structures of FPGAs with much less silicon and relatively 
more oxide and moulding compound complicate the heat 
conduction paths [1]. On the one hand, where it may 
deteriorate the worst-case heat dissipation route, a given 
power density, on the other hand, produces a significant 
temperature variability [2]. This results in a higher 
temperature for the same amount of power dissipation. It is, 
therefore, essential to consider thermal variation as an on-
going challenge for advanced technology nodes alongside 
the associated issues of power and timing closures. FIGURE 1.  Thermal profile depicting hotspots in an FPGA [4]. 
 2 
 Looking at the FPGA fabric, we find a mesh of layers 
comprising a substrate, high-k dielectric interfaces, and 
metal interconnects. Each layer has a varying range of 
thermal conductivity with silicon dioxide sitting at 1.3-
0.3W/mK, and copper metal interconnects going as high as 
400 W/mK [3]. These differences in thermal conductivity 
affect the heat transfer and introduce variations in 
temperature across the FPGA area, thereby creating hotspots 
as can be seen in Fig. 1. The resultant increase in temperature 
and appearance of hotspots across the FPGA surface causes 
non-negligible variations in the timing and power domains 
of the design [4]. This non-uniform thermal dissipation 
aggravates the ageing mechanism of negative bias 
temperature instability (NBTI) and leads to accelerated 
ageing of the FPGA fabric. 
 The NBTI ageing mechanism is dominated by a negative 
shift in threshold voltage (Vth) of pMOSFETs that make up 
the FPGA, along with nMOSFETs. The change in threshold 
voltage is in response to biasing in the strong inversion 
region, which causes the disintegration of Si-H bonds at the 
oxide interface due to the presence of holes within the pMOS 
inversion layer, as is evident in Fig. 2. This bond 
disintegration process creates positively charged interface 
traps, which, along with new or existing traps within the 
oxide, increases the threshold voltage [5], [6], [7]. 
 Undeniably, NBTI is well known to researchers and 
manufacturers alike as a dominant ageing mechanism in all 
different configurations of integrated circuits (ICs). For 
instance, in the post-IC manufacturing period of 7 to 10 years, 
accelerated ageing due to NBTI has been reported by [5] and 
[8] as degradation in threshold voltage up to 50 mV. Speed 
degradation (of 20%) follows these shifts in threshold 
voltage and, therefore, shows a strong correlation between 
NBTI prompted delay and threshold voltage shift.  
 It is important to note that the non-uniformity of NBTI 
(due to different thermal conductivity patterns) across the 
chip surface affects various blocks within the FPGA 
differently. As a result, the delay variations induced by NBTI, 
across the FPGA surface, could potentially generate new 
critical paths, which, in turn, may prevent an efficient and 
balanced timing closure [9]. In the case of data paths, for 
instance, an increase in gate delays causes a late transition of 
an input signal at the flip-flop. Such varying transitions 
violate the flip-flop setup and hold time that eventually 
results in the sampling of flawed values at the output of the 
data path.  
 These variations, apart from being the primary source of 
FPGA reliability concerns, also affect the integrity of logic 
applications and aggravate to levels that may lead to system 
failures. More alarming is the hardware security threat that 
can leverage the dwindling reliability of an FPGA device 
under NBTI influence. It can jeopardise FPGA’s optimal 
performance with the insertion of malicious and stealthy 
circuitry, called hardware Trojan – designed by exploiting 
stochastic and systematic variation patterns that exist within 
the FPGA. 
 The exacerbation of NBTI, owing to the continual 
transistor miniaturization, is fast becoming a major donor of 
the process of ageing in downscaled technology nodes. It 
poses a challenge for the proponents of high FPGA reliability 
and performance to understand the dynamics of NBTI in 
designing a hardware Trojan, initially, from an intruder’s (a 
rogue element) perspective and lately by designing a 
threshold voltage-aware sensor for its detection, followed by 
an effective mitigation methodology from security assurance 
and defender’s perspective. 
 In other words, it implies the development of an FPGA 
security scheme (Fig. 3), which assumes that an intruder is 
capable of capturing and analysing the shifts in threshold 
voltage of pMOSFETs (that result in lowering the frequency, 
signal path delay variations, and flawed transitions) due to 
the NBTI effect. If successful, the intruder may design and 
insert a stealthy malicious circuit (called hardware Trojan) 
inside the FPGA. With sufficient parametric information and 
precise monitoring, the intruder may capitalize NBTI ageing 
mechanism to activate a dormant hardware Trojan. This is 
further elaborated in the threat model described in section-
IIA. 
 It is well established that the detection of such hardware 
Trojans is difficult using testing techniques like built-in self-
test (BIST) because no test vector can activate an ageing 
effect [10]. The process of accelerated stress and ageing test 
on the affected node may, however, reveal such Trojans; 
FIGURE 3. FPGA security scheme comprising hardware 
Trojan Infection, Detection, and Mitigation sub-schemes. 
FIGURE 2.  NBTI mechanism in a PMOS transistor. 
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however, the process, when performed on a complete 
integrated circuit, is time and cost-intensive [11]. 
 In this paper, we direct the FPGA security scheme, 
shown in Fig. 3, towards the design and implementation of a 
threshold voltage-triggered hardware Trojan in a lower 
technology node (28 nm FPGA). A degradation in the drain 
current, oscillation frequency, and the subsequent increase in 
the response time (due to shift in threshold voltage) of the 28 
nm FPGA is observed through a novel sensor. An effort is 
also made to mitigate the impact of a hardware Trojan by 
introducing a method of compensation that enhances the 
current flow and lowers the rise in delay due to NBTI. This 
includes an online transistor dynamic scaling (OTDS) 
approach as a mitigation methodology to counter hardware 
Trojans.  
 The proposed designs and implementations are verified 
and validated using post-layout, and Monte Carlo 
simulations with Cadence Virtuoso ADE tools, followed by 
real-time experiments on Global Foundries fabricated 28 nm 
technology node. Threshold voltage-triggered hardware 
Trojan, ‘HTVth,’ operates in a threshold voltage region of 
0.45V-0.998V, consuming ultra-low power (10.5nW), and 
remaining stealthier within an area overhead of as low as 
1.5%. The Threshold Voltage-aware sensor, ‘SVth,’ utilizes  
3% of die resources and achieves the detection sensitivity of 
0.251mV/nA. OTDS enables the auto-resizing of transistors 
to mitigate the impact of hardware Trojan payload due to 
NBTI-based threshold voltage shifts falling between 10% 
and 90%. 
A. CONTRIBUTION 
This research work entails some key contributions. Firstly, 
we have provided a composite solution for security and 
reliability-threatened FPGAs, named as FPGA Security 
Scheme (Fig. 3). It involves: 1) Ingress of a stealthy 
threshold voltage-triggered hardware Trojan-(HT Infection 
Scheme), 2) Detection of hardware Trojan using lightweight 
Threshold Voltage - aware sensor (SVth)-(HT Detection 
Scheme), and 3) Mitigating the impact of hardware Trojan 
using online transistor dynamic scaling (OTDS)-(HT 
Mitigation Scheme). Secondly, the development of a 
stealthy hardware Trojan based on a combinatorial and 
sequential circuitry and NBTI ageing mechanism is one of 
its kind - operating in a subthreshold region makes it highly 
sensitive to shifts in threshold voltage and trigger the NBTI 
ageing mechanism. Thirdly, the lightweight Threshold 
Voltage-aware sensor is based on a fixed and dynamic pair 
of ring oscillators, capable of detecting small ageing levels 
through precise measurement of frequency and 
corresponding delay variations (in conformity with shifts in 
threshold voltage). And finally, a novel technique for 
mitigating hardware Trojan impact is proposed that provides 
a run-time tolerance circuitry capable of identifying critical 
gates with worst-case current degradation and subsequent 
transistor re-sizing to revive healthy current values. Equally 
significant is the fact that these schemes have been 
developed, keeping in mind the goal of achieving absolute 
optimization of the area and power overheads.  
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II 
gives information on the related work with a brief critique. 
In Section III, we delineate the design, simulation, and 
implementation of Threshold Voltage-triggered hardware 
Trojan, ‘HTVth,’ in a 28 nm technology node FPGA. Section 
IV presents the design and implementation of a Threshold 
Voltage-aware sensor (SVth - the hardware Trojan Detector) 
and discusses various options tested to achieve high sensor 
accuracy. In section-V, the mitigation technique based on 
online transistor dynamic scaling (auto-resizing) and its 
correlation with NBTI-induced performance degradation are 
highlighted. Section-VI puts forth the implementation and 
optimization of the HT mitigation scheme, whereas Section-
VII provides its simplistic comparison with some of the 
state-of-the-art reliability and security solutions. Section-
VIII concludes the paper with a future course of work. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
Extensive research has been undertaken to present a detailed 
analysis of ageing and performance degradation in integrated 
circuits. It mainly involves the fingerprinting of ICs’ 
electrical parameters (voltages, currents, frequencies, and 
EM signals) by retrofitting well-designed on-chip sensors 
and structures. Be it the detection of counterfeits, recycled 
ICs, or detection and mitigation of hardware Trojans; the 
same parameters are manipulated by researchers to 
understand different undesired behaviour patterns and 
anomalies in ICs (ASICs, FPGAs, and Microprocessors) for 
remediation and building effective countermeasures. 
 In [12], Karhunen Loéve theorem is used to study the 
power consumption behaviour of hardware Trojan infected 
FPGA to determine the possibility of its detection. This 
technique considers the impact of process variations that 
occur within the FPGA; however, it avoids the noise factor 
and is limited to simulation analysis. Similarly, the 
researchers in [13] have again simulated and analysed the 
occurrence of path delays in the signals of various logic 
applications using the embedded monitors. Both of these 
techniques do not provide real-time analysis. An integrated 
hardware system capable of monitoring the behaviour of 
critical interconnects (wires) is proposed in [14]; however, it 
does not provide sufficient information on the efficiency of 
this method. In [15], a test methodology to ease hardware 
Trojan triggering by increasing its electrical activity is 
proposed for early detection. In [16], an attempt to carry out 
precise measurement of an IC’s operating frequency, 
maximum frequency (fmax), and its dynamic power 
consumption is made by lowering the impact of process 
variations. However, the calculation of the accurate value of 
fmax is quite challenging and also susceptible to ‘false 
positives.’  
 The use of ring oscillators’ sensitivity to variations in 
temperature and power enables the detection of medium-to-
heavyweight hardware Trojans, however, not effective 
against the small-sized/lightweight hardware Trojans [17]. 
The researchers in [18] have created a network of ring 
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oscillators spread across the FPGA surface to capture the 
changes in their oscillation frequency due to the presence of 
hardware Trojan. This is validated using a digital storage 
oscilloscope (DSO) and later analysed using the principal 
component analysis to differentiate between the genuine and 
the HT infected FPGA. However, when applied to an ASIC 
[19], this technique suffers from the lower levels of 
measurement accuracy due to the usage of an 8-bit counter 
instead of a digital storage oscilloscope, questioning the 
accuracy of on-chip designs. 
 In [20], the clustering methodology is proposed, whereby 
dedicated sensors are embedded in the power grids of 
different voltage islands in FPGA, to enhance HT 
detectability. However, it does not provide adequate 
experimental evidence to evaluate the efficacy of this 
methodology. The capturing of electromagnetic signatures of 
target applications in ICs has also been studied for hardware 
Trojan and anomaly detection. For instance, a method based 
on electromagnetic (EM) cartography is proposed in [21], 
but then again, due to inappropriate method of interpretation 
of EM traces, the detection of hardware Trojans remains low. 
On the other hand, in [22], the researchers have devised an 
improved technique that interprets the EM traces optimally. 
By controlling and maintaining the temperature during EM 
measurements, this technique improves the probability of 
detecting lightweight hardware Trojans. Further to this, the 
researchers in [23] are able to differentiate between the 
healthy and HT infected population of FPGAs through a 
comprehensive analysis of EM signatures. 
 A reasonable amount of work has also been undertaken 
to design and develop various sensing techniques and 
frameworks for the detection and mitigation of the NBTI 
mechanism and its noticeable impact. In [24], an analog 
supply-devoid NBTI sensor is proposed to eliminate noise; 
however, the input of other external signals makes its 
operation very complicated during the stress and recovery as 
well as measurement modes. This reduces its overall 
measurement accuracy. In [25], the dynamic reliability of the 
device is managed using NBTI and HCI (Hot Carrier 
Injection) sensors. In this case, the threshold voltage of the 
stressed device is measured and transformed into the delay 
function. However, these sensors are less sensitive to 
temperature variations and occupy large device area with 
high power consumption. In another study [26] an NBTI 
sensor is designed to measure the standby leakage current 
(Iddq). Designed explicitly for SRAM cells, this sensor 
monitors the leakage current, characterising temporal 
degradations. It, however, requires an additional bias 
generator to maintain active load on the sensor, which results 
in non-linearity and reduced sensitivity to the input signal. 
Researchers in [27] have used the current-mirroring 
technique to capture NBTI based degradation. The power 
supply current is mirrored and subsequently transformed into 
voltage. The drawback of this approach lies in the usage of 
power gating that slows down the response time of the sensor. 
However, its performance is relatively more stable than the 
Iddq based sensor.  
 To mitigate NBTI ageing and degradation impact on the 
reliability and performance of an IC, we have come across 
the concept of one-time design constraints put forth by 
various researchers. For instance, [28], [29] suggest an 
increase in supply voltage to manage and control NBTI. This 
may, however, lead to power and thermal overheads – an 
undesirable design feature. Whereas [30] and [31] propose 
transistor oversizing and reduction in the clock frequency, 
respectively as an optimum NBTI mitigation. The thermal 
management of ICs via different cooling arrangements is 
also proposed to contain and reverse the NBTI impact [32]. 
Gate replacement technique is proposed in [33] that attempts 
to optimize the NBTI ageing effect. Techniques on the 
balancing and removal of stress to control short-duration 
threshold voltage instability are suggested by Choi et al. [34]. 
These, however, fail to consider the critical factor of 
prolonged ageing effect at high temperatures. In [35], 
Kiamehr et al. have highlighted the use of ageing-aware 
library standard cells to mitigate BTI impact on the rise and 
fall times of different signals. The threshold voltage shift is, 
initially, measured and later used to optimize the width ratio 
(Wp/Wn) of each transistor to counter the ageing effect. 
However, its applicability for IC run-time is not considered. 
Another study by Zhang et al. [36] describes the techniques 
that involve the identification of critical gates and their 
replacement with NBTI-tolerant gates. The use of dynamic 
voltage scaling and data flipping has also been proposed by 
[37] to recover the static noise margin in the case of SRAMs.  
 The measurement of a beat frequency between the 
reference and stressed ring oscillators using a silicon 
odometer is also proposed in [38] to keep track of 
degradation due to NBTI. Similarly, a hybrid scheme 
comprising ring oscillators and delay line based online-
ageing monitoring is presented in [39] for the measurement 
of degradation. These sensor schemes are, however, focused 
on ensuring precise measurements rather than triggering 
accelerated degradation to detect the presence of any notable 
anomaly. In order to fill in this gap, a low-cost and 
lightweight structure consisting of ring oscillator based 
sensors for in-field capturing of IC/FPGA ageing is proposed 
in [40] to enhance the granularity of detection.  
 More recently, authors in [41] have proposed a multitype 
hardware Trojan protection framework, called RG-Secure. 
This framework is designed and validated to provide RTL 
and gate-level security to FPGA based SoCs (deployed in IoT 
environment) against different types of hardware Trojans by 
merging 3PIP (third party intellectual property) trusted 
design approaches with the scan-chain netlist feature 
analysis. Employing tree-based learning algorithms, they 
have shown a good hardware Trojan detection coverage at 
RTL and gate-levels, with 100% true positive rate and 94% 
true negative rate accuracies. In our opinion and analysis, 
this method/framework holds true for less complex netlist 
structures and scan-chain features. However, it may not be 
effective against parametric hardware Trojans (e.g., 
threshold voltage-triggered) that have netlists of distinct 
structure and trigger behaviour.  
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 Our work, however, follows an integrated approach, as 
mentioned earlier, and encompasses three elements namely, 
HT insertion (infection), its detection, and mitigation. We 
build these elements considering the limitations and 
strengths of the abovementioned techniques and different on-
chip sensors’ architectures, with FPGA security and 
reliability in perspective. 
 
A. THREAT MODEL 
Hardware Trojan, a stealthily malicious entity, capable of 
inflicting performance degradation, sensitive information 
disclosure, and functional disorder at the micro-architectural 
level in FPGAs, continues to challenge the efforts toward 
strengthening hardware security. In an attempt to control its 
increasing threat, we construct a threat scenario/model to 
understand its implications for a high-end defence asset - a 
naval warship, fitted with an ‘Integrated Self-Protection 
System’ (ISPS) and eventually develop a full-spectrum 
FPGA security scheme.  
 ISPS is a real-time functional integration of electronic 
warfare systems used onboard naval warships and fighter 
aircraft as well. It comprises Electronic Support Measures’ 
(ESM) systems like Radar Warning Receivers (RWR), 
System Processor for threat environment assessment and 
asset assignment, and Electronic Counter Measures’ (ECMs) 
systems like Jammers and Chaff launchers.  
 We, however, focus on System Processor Module and 
regard it as a vulnerable entity in ISPS system due to its high 
probability of infection with security-compromised FPGAs. 
The threat scenario, as depicted in Fig. 4, has three main 
elements, namely: 1) the naval warship, 2) the Defence 
Systems Manufacturer - X, and 3) the FPGA Supplier - Y. 
The red sphere with letter ‘R’ represents the ‘Rogue 
Element’ that could be working with malicious intentions on 
its own, as a state-sponsored VLSI design specialist, or an 
anti-state element/enemy. We assume its presence at FPGA 
Supplier premises in ‘Design House,’ ‘Fabrication Facility,’ 
and ‘SoC Integration Section’ - all representative of the 
FPGA supply chain. The green sphere with the letter ‘D’ 
represents the authors’ recommendation on forming a 
‘Security Assurance and Defence Team’ to counter the 
malicious insertion in FPGA by the rogue element. Its 
presence is recommended in all three elements.  
 The threat process begins with the naval warship placing 
the requirement of a new System Processor Module 
(installed with n-number of FPGAs, providing vital 
electronic warfare functions) for the ISPS system from the 
FIGURE 4.  Threat Model: A novel self-triggered Threshold Voltage-Shift based Hardware Trojan ‘HTVth’ is 
designed and implemented by a rogue element in a 28 nm FPGA used in System Processor Module of ISPS 
(Integrated Self Protection System) of a Naval Warship. 
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Defence Systems’ Manufacturer-X. Subsequently, the FPGA 
supplier -Y is sub-contracted by X to provide FPGAs built 
on 28 nm process technology. A rogue element R, stationed 
in a Y design house, receives the task of designing the FPGA. 
Here, we assume that R is an expert FPGA designer with 
sufficient working knowledge of FPGA design flow, specific 
to the insertion of stealthy hardware Trojan based on the 
threshold voltage shifts in PMOS transistors. Such type of 
hardware Trojans corresponds to the functionality level 
parametric characterization [42] and are targeted at 
paralysing device/system functionality. To maintain 
undetectability, R employs ‘Split hardware Trojan 
Insertion’ methodology, whereby a part of a hardware 
Trojan circuit is built at the design stage in the design house. 
Post design and successful simulation, the design file (GDSII) 
is forwarded to the FPGA fabrication facility for 
manufacturing. Here, the remaining part of hardware Trojan 
is added (at the RTL and Gate level) post-manufacturing 
reliability tests by another rogue element (collaborator) at 
the FPGA fabrication facility to evade detection. As per our 
recommendation (mentioned in Fig. 4), if D is also stationed 
at the design house, it will design detection and mitigation 
circuitry in addition to the hardware Trojan circuit design by 
R (with both D and R remaining oblivious of each other’s 
work). The newly fabricated chips are now ready for 
installation on the system processor module at X. The 
security assurance and defence team D at X carries out pre-
installation security tests to observe anomalies specific to 
hardware Trojan based on threshold voltage shifts. If the tests 
are clear, the FPGA is installed on the system processor 
module and delivered to the end-user - the naval warship. At 
this point, we make two assumptions. Firstly, if the detection 
and mitigation circuitry fails and the hardware Trojan gets 
triggered, the damage to ISPS operation ability will occur. 
Secondly, if the detection and mitigation circuitry 
successfully detects and mitigates the hardware Trojan, the 
ISPS system will continue performing efficiently without 
any hindrances, provided some other faults that are not 
related to hardware Trojan erupt. As can be seen in Fig. 4, 
we have also recommended the placement of D in the naval 
warship. So, before installing the system processor module 
in the ISPS system for harbour and sea acceptance trials 
(HATs and SATs), D must carry out security tests to 
challenge the first assumption and in case of it holding true, 
return the module to X for replacement.  
 In a nutshell, as shown in Fig. 4, if the ‘red-dotted line’ 
route (containing the FPGA infected with hardware Trojan 
but without any detection and mitigation component of 
FPGA security scheme) is adopted, the hardware Trojan 
would remain undetected and get triggered with pre-defined 
threshold voltage shift, thereby causing ISPS system 
performance degradation and leaving the ship vulnerable to 
a devastating missile attack. On the other hand, if the ‘black-
dotted line’ route (containing a robust FPGA security 
scheme) is assumed, the hardware Trojan can be easily 
detected and denied triggering, thereby keeping the ISPS 
system proficient in thwarting any external threat to the ship. 
 Considering the above threat scenario/model, we, in the 
following sections, make an effort to sequentially develop a 
realistic FPGA security scheme for the security assurance 
and defence team to not only provide security and 
dependable redundancy to critical systems like ISPS but also 
augment the post-manufacturing tests regime (security tests, 
in specific) employed by FPGA manufacturers. The first step, 
in this regard, is the design and implementation of a 
hardware Trojan itself, followed by detection and mitigation 
circuitries based on the Trojan’s impact on target FPGA 
applications.  
 
III. THRESHOLD VOLTAGE-TRIGGERED HARDWARE 
TROJAN  
In line with the FPGA security scheme (Fig. 3), we define 
the contours of the hardware Trojan (HT)-infection scheme. 
It encompasses an operational system’s FPGA (28 nm 
technology) vulnerable to ingress of hardware Trojan, which 
in turn, inflicts operational and functional damages to the 
system and its various components. 
 Beginning with HT-infection scheme, we construct a 
hardware Trojan with details as follows:  
A. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
As mentioned earlier, the high temperature activates the 
NBTI mechanism in the FPGA silicon fabric. Resultantly, it 
accelerates the process of ageing and leads to undesirable 
characteristics. For instance, temperature changes beyond 
75⁰C between different layers of a substrate could cause 
variations in interconnect delays up to 31-38% [43]. 
Subsequently, the device tends to operate slower with delays 
also observable in the control and data signals. Such timing 
inconsistencies cause synchronous circuits transit into 
redundant states or momentary glitches. However, to avoid 
failures, the clock period can be managed to counter the 
system glitches. The authors in [44] have, nevertheless, 
suggested that despite clock management, the period of 
TABLE I.  Impact of NBTI aging mechanism on PMOS 
transistor parameters.  
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momentary glitches tends to increase with NBTI and may set 
off pre-determined activity related to malicious circuitry. 
 Tabular analysis (Table I) of the results obtained by [45] 
reveals that:(a) the shift in threshold voltage (Vth) and drain 
current (Idd) is a function of high temperature and is observed 
to increase for Vth and decrease for Idd at temperatures ≥ 60⁰C, 
(b) an approximate rise of 4% in the threshold voltage shift 
is evident with the scaling down of technology nodes [46]. 
The rate of decrease in Idd is, however, less than the rate of 
Vth increase, and (c) eventually, the propagation delays 
increase with the aforementioned trends of variation in Vth 
and Idd.  
  In light of the above, the essential design targets for 
threshold voltage-triggered hardware Trojan (HTVth) are set 
accordingly such that: (a) the transfer function of the Trojan 
circuit must be linear. (b) sensitivity to temperature and 
threshold voltage changes should be significantly high, (c) 
the change in the output should be significantly high for a 
change in the input, and (d) negligible temporal degradation 
and tolerance to process variations should be maintained. 
  Additionally, the element of stealthiness and 
undetectability of hardware Trojan is highly significant 
(primarily from the perspective of a rogue element). 
Hardware Trojan, by definition, has to be stealthy to escape 
detection. In order to achieve this, we have ensured during 
design and implementation stages (described in the following 
sections) that the size of the circuitry is as small as possible 
with equally low power consumption and without 
compromising the effectiveness of its payload. Regarding 
the area and resource utilization at the circuit and RTL/Gate 
level, we have used as minimum instantiation as possible to 
ensure low area and power overheads. These have been 
measured to be at just 1.5 % of the total available resources 
on a 28 nm process technology. With such a small 
percentage, it is highly unlikely that the added circuitry of 
hardware Trojan would be discovered either during post-
manufacturing tests or during run-time monitoring. Hence in 
a multi-million gates chip, it can hide easily. Also, more 
importantly, the proposed threshold voltage triggered Trojan 
does not draw any extra current while dormant; therefore, it 
becomes challenging even to detect it through power 
signature analysis.  
B. ARCHITECTURE OF THRESHOLD VOLTAGE 
TRIGGERED HARDWARE TROJAN (HTVth) 
We propose a circuit implementation of threshold voltage-
triggered hardware Trojan, HTVth, which is valid for CMOS 
devices. The implementation is demonstrated for both the 
sequential and combinatorial logic as follows: 
 
1) CONCEPTUALISING HARDWARE TROJAN IN 
COMBINATORIAL CIRCUITS 
Considering the combinatorial circuit for hardware Trojan, 
a 2-input NAND gate is designed to have two PMOS 
transistors M1 and M2 parallel to one another. These are then 
connected in series to two NMOS transistors M3 and M4, as 
shown in Fig. 5. The drain terminals of both M1 and M2 are 
shared and connected to the source terminal of M3. The 
output of the NAND gate is tapped out at M3. Another 
PMOS transistor, MT (Trojan Transistor), is constructed in 
series with a MOS resistor (MR) to work as a hardware 
Trojan. The MOS resistor acts as a current limiter as soon as 
the triggering signal is received at the MT gate terminal. A 
compact silicon area of 50μm2 is occupied by this circuitry 
with a low power consumption of 1.05μW. 
 Operationally, the Trojan is kept in the ‘ON’ stealthy 
state so that the transistors M1 and M2 remain connected to 
the power supply (VDD). The output of the NAND gate, on 
the other hand, is ‘0’ when both of its inputs A and B are ‘1’. 
Otherwise, the output always remains at ‘1’. As MT, the 
hardware Trojan receives an NBTI induced shift in threshold 
voltage (triggering signal) at its gate terminal; it initiates the 
process of accelerated device ageing with elevated 
temperatures and reduced frequency of the NAND gate 
circuitry. The shift in the threshold voltage, which acts as a 
trigger for the hardware Trojan, needs to be measured very 
carefully. For this purpose, we have also designed a 
threshold voltage measuring circuit, termed as ‘Threshold 
Voltage Meter’ (The detailed configuration of this circuit is 
Clock
X1
Combinatorial 
Circuit
D Q
QD X0
L
K
FIGURE 5.  Schematic of a threshold voltage-triggered 
hardware Trojan (HTVth) in a combinatorial circuit (2-input 
NAND gate). 
FIGURE 6.  Block diagram representation of a sequential 
circuit. 
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given in section IIIC). With the value of threshold voltage 
(Vth) exceeding the pre-defined level (pre-Trojan Trigger 
Threshold Voltage- Vth_ptt), a triggering signal is generated 
at the gate terminal of MT. This active high triggering signal 
switches the MT ‘OFF’ and leaves the PMOS transistors M1 
and M2 without power, thereby affecting the operation of the 
NAND gate. 
 
2) CONCEPTUALISING HARDWARE TROJAN IN 
SEQUENTIAL CIRCUITS 
In order to build a sequential circuit for hardware Trojan 
demonstration, we consider adding two flip flops (K and L) 
to the combinatorial circuit, as shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7. 
The binary decoding with two bits X and Y as the most 
significant bit (MSB) and the least significant bit (LSB), 
respectively, are used for the flip flops. An inactive hardware 
Trojan, MT, is embedded into the flip flop K (overall area 
of this circuitry raises to 75μm2, consuming power of 
1.25μW). Under no-triggering and normal operating 
conditions, the sequential circuit functions optimally without 
any effect on the dynamic power consumption. As the MT is 
triggered, the supply voltage (VDD) feeding the flip flop ‘K’ 
is cut off, resulting in the malfunction of the flow of finite 
state machine (FSM). Although the flip flop ‘L’ remains 
unaffected and healthy, the failing of flip flop ‘K’ reduces 
the FSM states to only two high impedance states - z0 and z1.  
 The above structure is further elaborated by constructing 
a true single-phase clock (TSPC) based flip flop. The 
payload is the same PMOS transistor MT with a MOS 
resistor (MR) connected in series to it, as shown in Fig. 5. 
MT, acting as a switch, controls the connection of the body 
and source of all PMOS transistors (M1, M2, M4, M7, and 
M10) in the flip flop. The bodies of all NMOS transistors 
(M3, M5, M6, M8, M9, and M11) are grounded permanently. 
When the switch MT is ‘ON,’ all the PMOS transistors 
remain connected to VDD. On the contrary, when the switch 
MT is in ‘OFF’ state, the body and the source of all PMOS 
FIGURE 7.  Schematic of threshold voltage-triggered hardware 
Trojan in a Sequential Circuit (TSPC based Flip Flop). 
(a) 
(b) 
FIGURE 8.  (a) Schematic of a 3-stage Ring Oscillator-based 
heating element with Time-to-Digital Converter. 
(b) 28 nm technology node floor-planned with 08 x heating 
elements. (c) Thermal profile of FPGA (28 nm technology 
node) with 08 x heating elements. 
(c) 
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transistors are shorted to ground through the resistor, leaving 
the flip flop without power supply and resulting in circuit 
malfunction. Similar to the triggering of MT in the 
combinatorial circuit, the shift in threshold voltage due to 
NBTI is designed to initiate MT triggering here in the 
sequential structure as well. A Global Foundries 28 nm 
process technology is used to accomplish circuit 
implementations and subsequent logic applications.  
 
3) ADDING RING OSCILLATOR BASED HEATING 
ELEMENT FOR ACCELERATED NBTI IMPACT 
To accelerate the NBTI ageing mechanism and observe a 
corresponding shift in threshold voltage ‘Vth,’ we designed 
and implemented a LUT-based ring oscillator to act as a 
heating element for raising the temperature high enough to 
trigger NBTI. The architecture of the heating element is 
shown in Fig. 8(a). It is important to note here that this 
heating element is designed and implemented as an integral 
part of the hardware Trojan infection scheme. 
 As stated earlier, there exists a strong correlation between 
the shift in threshold voltage and the die temperature. Taking 
this into account, a set of eight controllable ring oscillators 
(ROs), comprising 3-inverter stages and a time-to-digital 
converter (TDC) each, are implemented across the FPGA 
fabric (28 nm technology node) at locations shown in Fig. 
8(b) using the Vivado design suite. It is noteworthy that the 
number of stages in a ring oscillator determines the toggling 
frequency and hence, the corresponding amount of heat 
generation, measurable as a variation in temperature [47]. In 
order to disrupt the ISPS system, the toggling frequency of 
an RO must be high enough to generate a large amount of 
heat per micron for high temperatures. Accordingly, only a 
single LUT is used to implement RO with 3-inverter stages 
and a TDC.  
 We define the area-constraint for our heating elements to 
only 8 LUTs (0.00025%) out of the total 32,000 LUTs 
constituting the CLBs. The built-in system monitor is then 
programmed to access XADC sensor readings of the thermal 
diode in FPGA. The heating element is enabled/disabled by 
a time-driven program running on the FPGA, which also 
keeps reading the temperature values and transmitting them 
to the workstation via the JTAG interface.  
 The execution of the experiment is organized in such a 
way that the die temperature of the FPGA is allowed to 
stabilise for a period of 35 minutes before enabling the 
heating element for a period of 40 minutes. Upon completion 
of this operational phase, the heating element is disabled and 
allowed to rest for 35 minutes. During this period, the fall in 
temperature is observed to assess the behaviour of the 
heating element. Finally, the heating element is again 
enabled for another 40 minutes to affirm the repeatability and 
validity of the experiment. 
 We tested the LUT based ring oscillators (the heating 
elements) spread over eight different locations on the FPGA  
as per the procedure mentioned in the previous paragraph 
and measured it toggling at 550 MHz. The temperature 
measurements were made using the FPGA’s internal thermal 
diode ( for the whole FPGA), on-chip thermal sensors (the 
LUT based RO connected to the counter for local 
temperature), and the external laser-based IR temperature 
gun, positioned over the FPGA package.  
 Initially, the temperature is stabilised to an idle FPGA 
state, meaning when it is powered up and configured, with 
the negligible workload, and without the heating elements 
enabled. The idle temperature for the whole die (junction 
temperature) is measured to be 10.5⁰C, the local RO 10⁰C, 
and the surface 5⁰C. The heating elements are subsequently 
enabled with clock disabled to achieve asynchronous 
behaviour of LUT based RO and toggle as fast as physically 
possible without any clock constraint. Upon enabling the 
heating elements one by one for a period of 40 minutes each, 
the local, junction, and surface temperatures depicting the 
thermal profile of an FPGA is obtained, as shown in Fig. 8 
(c). It can be seen that the temperatures rise considerably 
higher to cause shifts in the threshold voltage and accelerate 
the NBTI degradation mechanism. The threshold voltage 
meter, described later, continuously measures the voltage till 
the time the hardware Trojan circuit is triggered at a value 
above the nominal ‘Vth ’ value (0.45V). 
C. THRESHOLD VOLTAGE METER 
As mentioned earlier, the shift in threshold voltage ‘Vth’ is 
the manifestation of the ageing mechanism of NBTI in 
PMOS transistors that make up the FPGA fabric and its 
primitives. Therefore, the precise measurement of ‘Vth’ is 
critical for triggering the threshold voltage based hardware 
Trojan. Accordingly, we design and implement a threshold 
voltage meter that directly generates an output voltage ‘Vout,’ 
equal to ‘Vth.’ Figure 9 shows the schematic diagram of the 
meter. As is evident, this circuit has no reference voltage 
‘Vref ’ input and is, therefore, a 3-terminal circuit. The 
transistors Q31 and Q32 provide a bias voltage at the gate of 
Q11; this voltage is then applied to the low voltage ‘VLO’ 
terminal of the differential amplifier, i.e., at the gate of Q22. 
Whereas, the transistors Q11-Q15 implement a circuit whose 
output is applied to the high voltage ‘VHI’ terminal of the 
differential amplifier at the gate of Q21. Eventually, the 
Q 31 Q 14 Q 15
Q 21
Q 22
Vout = Vth
VDD
Q 11 Q 13
Q 12
Q 32
VLO
VHI
Two-Transistor Differential Amplifier 
Circuit - performs subtraction :   
Vout  = VHI   -  VLO   =  Vth     
Threshold Voltage Extraction 
Circuit-Output is fed to VHI 
terminal (the gate of Q21) 
Self-Biasing Circuit - provides a 
bias voltage to Q11 of Extraction 
Circuit and VLO terminal (Q22) of 
Differential Amplifier 
FIGURE 9.  Schematic of Threshold Voltage Meter. The output 
of the Differential Amplifier is the Threshold Voltage (Vth).   
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differential amplifier comprising Q21 and Q22 performs the 
subtraction process outputs ‘Vth’ at the drain of Q22, as 
shown in Fig. 9. 
 In order to validate the operation-ability, functionality, 
and accuracy of the designed hardware Trojan, an 
experiment consisting of all elements of HT infection 
scheme (RO based heating elements, threshold voltage 
meter, and the trojan circuit) is performed. It ascertains 
whether a triggering signal, a shift (increment) in pre-
defined threshold voltage, can be latched or not. 
Furthermore, in case of being latched, ascertain whether the 
payload (accelerated ageing) of the hardware Trojan gets 
activated. A controlled temperature environment is ensured 
using a thermal chamber with an HT infection scheme-
implemented FPGA (28 nm technology node) placed inside 
it. The external temperature (i.e., thermal chamber 
temperature) is maintained between 5-10⁰C (a typical 
warship computer control room temperature). The JTAG 
interface is used for programming and bidirectional 
communication between the FPGA and the workstation. 
Digital oscilloscope, Vivado power analyser, FPGA system 
monitor, and integrated logic analyser (ILA) are employed to 
capture the threshold voltage, drain current, and thermal 
points.  
 The first stage is the initialization of FPGA under test. 
This involves the stabilization of the thermal chamber at 5⁰C, 
powering up of the target FPGA, and providing an operating 
voltage of 1.0V. Once powered up, the LUT based ring 
oscillators implemented to produce heat are enabled. This 
leads to the second stage where the heat (rise in temperature 
and a corresponding shift in threshold voltage) generated by 
the heating elements, spread across the device at locations 
shown in Fig. 8(b) is continuously measured and logged 
using the local as well as the system monitor. The temporal 
change in temperature observed is shown in Fig. 10. As the 
temperature traverses the primary thermal point of ‘Tp1’ 
(60⁰C), the changes in threshold voltage ‘Vth’ and ‘Idd’ are 
extracted and measured by Threshold Voltage meter. 
Similarly, the changes are continually observed, and 
measurements are taken at secondary and tertiary thermal 
points (Tp2 -90⁰C and Tp3 -125⁰C respectively). We took 10K 
samples for each thermal point at all the eight different 
locations within FPGA. A complete mesh of plot showing 
the shifts in threshold voltage with change in temperature is 
given in Fig. 10. In the third stage, these readings are 
critically analysed for false positives and accuracy for 
temperature variation and corresponding shifts in threshold 
voltage as well as ‘Idd’ to observe the presence of any process 
variations. Accordingly, three additional runs are undertaken 
to take further readings and observe intra-run deviations to 
establish measurement accuracy. During all these three 
stages, the hardware Trojan trigger circuit remains silent 
connected with the NAND gate and TSPC PMOS transistors  
FIGURE 10.  % Shift in threshold voltage with rise in temperature 
across 8 different intra-die locations. Threshold voltage meter is used 
to read Vth. Reference Vth is pre-defined at 0.45V. 
FIGURE 11a.  An increase of 40% shift in threshold voltage at 
90⁰C degrades the drain current by 35%, triggers the 
hardware Trojan and impairs the NAND2 logic. 
FIGURE 11b.  An increase of 50% shift in threshold voltage at 
90⁰C degrades the drain current by 40%, triggers the hardware 
Trojan and impairs the TSPC logic. 
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TABLE II.  Hardware Trojan Triggering Analysis in NAND2 
Logic. 
 
till the time the hardware Trojan trigger circuit experiences 
a shift in threshold voltage from 0.45V to 0.63V (40%) in 
NAND2 and 0.67V (50%) in TSPC logic. Consequently, the 
trigger circuit of hardware Trojan causes corresponding 
significant Idd degradation, as can be seen in Fig. 11(a) and 
Fig. 11(b) respectively. This, eventually cuts off the VDD 
connection of the PMOS transistors, which constitute the 
NAND gate and TSPC. As a result, the whole logic is 
deactivated, thereby crippling its critical function. The 
quantitative representation of the percentage shift in 
threshold voltage (an increase in this case) of MOSFETs that  
triggers the stealthy hardware Trojan is given in Tables II 
and III.  
  Before approaching a trigger percentage shift in Vth, a 
gradual increase in signal delays is also observable, for 
instance, with a 50% shift in the threshold voltage and 
corresponding 40% shift in Idd, the increase in the rise and 
fall times from 20.5 ps and 26.7 ps respectively to 22.9 ps 
and 28.0 ps is recorded. TSPC and NAND circuits remain 
stable with no triggering of hardware Trojan. However, the 
slowing down of switching control is observable. As the 
threshold voltage shift hits 50% of the nominal threshold 
value of 0.45V, the hardware Trojan gets activated. The same 
is observed for 70% to 100% shifts in the nominal threshold 
voltage. This experimental result is in consonance with the  
TABLE III.  Hardware Trojan Triggering Analysis in True 
Single Phase Clock (TSPC) Logic. 
 
Monte Carlo simulation carried out by sweeping parameter 
values using Gaussian distribution. For the simulation 
purposes, the mean value is set to the nominal threshold 
voltage value (0.45V), whereas the standard deviation (±σ) is 
kept at ±0.1V of the mean value.  
 
IV. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A THRESHOLD 
VOLTAGE-AWARE SENSOR  
The requirement of a lightweight and highly sensitive sensor 
for the detection of shifts in threshold voltage much earlier 
than the triggering of hardware Trojan is a critical design 
consideration. This is to ensure that the hardware Trojan 
never gets triggered, provided its presence in FPGA has been 
accurately assessed. We draw the attention of readers to the  
vital nature of a naval warship defence capability that should 
not get compromised due to faltering EW-ISPS system 
dependent on system processor, housing an FPGA. 
Therefore, the design and implementation of a highly 
sensitive sensor that detects minor shifts in threshold voltage 
due to the NBTI effect captures the corresponding frequency 
shifts and signal path delays and monitors the resultant 
ageing of the device to provide high confidence in ISPS 
system performance is paramount. This forms the whole 
concept of the HT-detection scheme, which is designed and 
implemented at the recommended placements of security 
assurance and defence teams, D (Fig. 4).  
A. THRESHOLD VOLTAGE BASED SENSOR 
ARCHITECTURE 
In continuation to the next stage of the threat model and 
keeping in perspective the techniques mentioned in [48] and 
[49], we propose a lightweight sensor that consists of two 
segments of ring oscillators (ROs), namely the ‘Fixed 
Sensor Segment (FSS)’ and the ‘Dynamic Sensor Segment 
(DSS)’ as shown in Fig. 12. The fixed sensor segment is 
designed to experience shifts in threshold voltage at a slower 
rate as compared to the dynamic sensor segment, which is 
made to undergo thermal stresses put through the hardware 
Trojan infection scheme. This must lower the oscillation  
NAND2  
 
Temp. 
(⁰C) 
Vth (V) % 
Shift in 
Vth 
Idd 
(μA) 
% Shift 
in Idd 
HT 
Triggered 
5 0.45 0 25 0 Not 
10 0.45 0 25 0 Not 
60 0.49 
(Vth_ptt) 
10 23 8 Not 
90 0.63 40 16.25 35 Yes 
125 0.76 70 10 60 Yes 
150 0.85 90 6.25 75 Yes 
True Single Phase Clock (TSPC) Logic 
 
Temp. 
(⁰C) 
Vth (V) % 
Shift in 
Vth 
Idd 
(μA) 
% Shift 
in Idd 
HT 
Triggered 
5 0.45 0 25 0 Not 
10 0.45 0 25 0 Not 
      
60 0.54 
(Vth_ptt) 
20 22 10 Not 
90 0.68 50 15 40 Yes 
125 0.81 80 8.75 65 Yes 
150 0.90 100 3.75 85 Yes 
FIGURE 12.  The architecture of Threshold Voltage-Aware Sensor  
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frequency of the dynamic sensor segment while the fixed 
sensor segment exhibits a negligible change in its oscillation 
frequency. With the increasing disparity between the 
oscillation frequencies of these two segments, the signs of 
FPGA ageing and hence signal path delays provide a 
precursor to the inserted hardware Trojan triggering and 
payload activity. 
 It is pertinent to mention that the accuracy of a sensor is 
susceptible to large process variations (PVs) that exist in 
lower technology nodes. When process variations outpace 
shifts in oscillation frequency and threshold voltages, it 
becomes challenging to differentiate the impact of NBTI 
from that of the global and local process variations (and this 
impacts the accuracy of detection and parametric 
measurements). We overcome this by placing the two 
segments of ROs very close to each other to zeroise PV and 
any environmental variation other than the one generated by 
the hardware Trojan insertion scheme (i.e., the rise in 
temperature).  
 The detailed architecture of the proposed sensor is shown 
in Fig. 12. As can be seen, the dynamic sensor segment is 
sensitized by introducing a pass transistor between inverters 
and pulling down the inputs of all inverters to the ground 
through a network of nMOS transistors. In order to keep all 
the electrical parameters like node capacitance, resistance, 
etc. closely matched to the dynamic sensor segment, the 
same structure is maintained within the fixed sensor segment. 
Such an arrangement helps ensure that at the time ‘t0’, when 
there is no shift in threshold voltage, the difference of 
oscillation frequency between the two segments is minimal. 
The only impact observable could be the small variations 
present between the ROs of the two segments.  
 In order to implement a specific mode of operation, a 
decoder circuit is inserted before the two sensor segments to 
generate the corresponding internal signals, as shown in 
Table IV. For instance, when enable EN is set to ‘0’, the RO 
segments start oscillating while the pass transistors stay ‘ON.’ 
A timer-controlled counter is placed at the segments’ output 
to enable an instant measurement of their respective cycle 
counts. For our design of the sensor, four distinct modes of 
operation, as explained in Table IV, are considered. At mode 
1 (00), both the segments are inactive or in the dormant phase 
as their connection to the power and ground line is cut off. 
This mode is valid for the duration, the heating elements are 
silent, i.e., during the stabilization phase of the thermal 
chamber. As the heating element is enabled, and it 
approaches the primary thermal point (Tp1 - 60⁰C), operation 
mode 2 (01) is enforced. In this mode, the fixed sensor 
segment (FSS) remains dormant (0), whereas the dynamic 
sensor segment (DSS) assumes the threshold voltage-aware 
mode (1). Every inverter in DSS is now subjected to dc stress 
(induced by gradual shifts in threshold voltage) by pulling its 
input to the ground. This causes changes in its oscillation 
frequency/cycle count and induces signal delays. When the 
secondary thermal point Tp2 -90⁰C is reached, the operation 
modes 3 (10) and 4 (11) are activated, and oscillation 
frequencies/cycle counts of both RO segments are measured. 
This process of measurement continues until the FPGA 
junction temperature reaches the tertiary thermal point Tp3 -
125⁰C. It must be noted here that these measurements are 
aimed at (1) testing and validating the threshold voltage-
aware sensor’s efficiency in terms of power and area 
consumption, (2) determining the frequency threshold of a 
hardware Trojan-free FPGA at varying locations, and (3) the 
impact of process variations (PVs) on sensor’s accuracy. 
B. DETERMINING THRESHOLD FREQUENCY FOR 
CORRELATION AND AUTHENTICATION  
In order to develop a trustworthy threshold voltage triggered 
hardware Trojan detection scheme, we have defined Trojan-
free and Trojan-infected process flows to establish the 
presence of hardware Trojan in an FPGA. Figure 13 shows 
the two processes. The main purpose behind the Trojan-free 
frequency mapping is to determine the threshold frequency 
‘fth’ corresponding to pre-Trojan trigger threshold voltage 
TABLE IV.    Binary Modes of Operation. 
FIGURE 13.  Process flows for the identification, 
authentication, and assessment of  Trojan-free and Trojan-
infected FPGAs using frequency and delay mapping method. 
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‘Vth_ptt’ and provide a reference to compare the frequency 
differences of FSS and DSS ‘fFD’ with it. If ‘fFD’ is greater 
than ‘fth,’ we consider this as an indication of 
‘HTVth’(threshold voltage-triggered hardware Trojan) 
presence and a precursor to its triggering and payload effect.  
During the Trojan-free frequency mapping phase, a 28 nm 
FPGA is used to generate the requisite distributions to 
determine the threshold frequency ‘fth.’ The Trojan-free 
phase implies that the Trojan circuit is already inserted and 
present in the FPGA but lying in a dormant state. 
 Although the two RO segments are placed very close to 
each other to zeroise the difference of oscillations ‘fFD’ 
between them, yet due to process variations, it will not be 
zero. Also, a Gaussian distribution of ‘fFD’ is observed 
during the tests. A simplified representation of the two 
distributions as probability density functions of ‘fFD’ at times 
‘0’ g0(fFD ) and ‘t’ gt(fFD ) is shown in Fig. 14. The frequency 
differences between the two RO segments ‘fFD’ are 
represented by the x-axis, whereas the y-axis represents the 
relative distribution function. The overlapping area gives the 
false prediction of the presence of hardware Trojan or vice 
versa. The red area ‘θa’ represents the probability of 
detecting Trojan-infected FPGA as ‘HT-free,’ whereas the 
green area θb denotes the probability of identifying the 
Trojan-free FPGA as ‘HT-infected.’ Mathematically, 
 
   =       (   )          
   
                                                  (1) 
   =       (   )        
   
                                                    (2) 
 where g0(fFD ) and gt(fFD ) correspond to the distribution 
of frequency differences for Trojan-free (dormant) and 
Trojan-infected FPGAs, respectively. The threshold 
frequency ‘fth’ is considered to be a point where both 
distributions intersect one another, hence representing the 
frequency difference that reduces the total probability of 
error ( θa + θb ). 
C. REDUCING THE RATE OF FALSE PREDICTION 
When the application risk is as critical as in our ISPS case, it 
is not prudent to let the false prediction, as identified earlier, 
result in the system failure by failing the proposed sensor to 
detect hardware Trojan. The repercussions of such a failure 
may include the collapse of a defence system of the warship 
and fatal impact on human and material assets. We have, 
therefore, devised a process of minimizing (zeroising) the 
level of false prediction of the presence of hardware Trojan 
and vice versa, as shown in Fig. 15(a)-(c). We observe that 
false prediction is generated due to the overlap of FSS and 
DSS ROs’ frequency difference distribution at time ‘0’ 
g0(fFD) and at time ‘t’ gt(fFD), which, in this case, is the ‘delay’ 
replica of g0(fFD). It implies that if this overlapping region is 
reduced, the critical issue of false prediction can be resolved.  
FIGURE 14.  Probability density function fFD at times 0 
g0(fFD ) and t gt(fFD ). 
(a) 
(c) 
FIGURE 15.  Reduction of false prediction - represented by the 
overlapped area. (a) Moving the FSS and DSS distributions 
away from their respective positions. (b) Minimizing their 
spread. (c) Minimal spread with a shift of the mean of FSS and 
DSS distributions. 
 
(b) 
(a) 
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 Accordingly, as a first step, we increase the separation of 
these distributions, which represents the delay degradation 
‘δf`, by shifting the distribution g0(fFD) to the left g´0(fFD) or 
alternatively shifting the distribution gt(fFD) to the right 
g´t(fFD) or by implementing both simultaneously as shown in 
the Fig. 15(a). We observed an improved detection of shifts 
in frequency corresponding to gradual shifts in the threshold 
voltage as the distribution gt(fFD) is shifted to the right. 
Secondly, we consider reducing the spread of FSS and DSS 
frequency difference distributions. The spread is observed 
due to the variances of distributions (σ02 and σt2). As can be 
seen in Fig. 15(b), there is no overlap between g´0(fFD) and 
g´t(fFD), where σ'0 < σ0 and σ't < σt . This arrangement also 
helps to minimise the false prediction rate. Thirdly, we 
reduce the spread and increase the separation of these two 
distributions simultaneously, as depicted in Fig. 15(c), 
instead of managing them individually. In such a case, we 
discard the right-hand side and reduce the spread of g0(fFD) 
on the left-hand side. It helps reduce the overall spread. The 
separation, on the other hand, is simultaneously increased by 
shifting gt(fFD) to the right-hand side. This technique 
provides the best detection of frequency degradation and 
hence, the delay - a pointer towards hardware Trojan activity 
and corresponding ageing of an FPGA under test. For a 
detailed account of determining maximum frequency 
degradation through the application of ‘Averaging and 
Selection’ methods, please refer to appendices A and B at 
the end of this paper. 
D. RE-ARCHITECTURING THE SENSOR WITH 
ADDITIONAL RING OSCILLATOR SEGMENTS 
Based on the mathematical mean and variance derivations 
for FSS and DSS segments with additional RO pairs 
(explained in detail at Appendix A), we re-architectured the 
sensor, as shown in Fig. 16. It consists of the same segments 
but with two additional threshold voltage shift-aware RO 
pairs in both. The decision to implement an additional 
number of RO pairs is primarily aimed at enhancing 
detectability of abnormal frequency degradation in the 
shortest amount of time with a negligible false prediction. 
The results of our experiment show that by the addition of 
FIGURE 17.  Process flow for enhanced detectability of 
hardware Trojan using optimum-performing RO pairs’ 
selection strategy. 
FIGURE 18.  Scatter plot of correlation between dynamic 
frequency degradation (% δf ) and percentage frequency 
difference (%  ft DSS ) of DSS ROs (Refer to Appendix B). 
 
FIGURE 16.  Threshold Voltage-aware sensor with enhanced 
detectability of hardware Trojan due to additional RO pairs 
architecture.  
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two more RO pairs in both the segments, the detectability of 
hardware Trojan based on shifts in threshold voltage is 
unerring.  
 Looking further at the architecture of the proposed sensor 
in Fig. 16, it can be seen that the outputs of all the three RO 
pairs in both the segments are fed to a multiplexer. A shift 
register of log2 (2n) bit facilitates the Mux. input selection 
and helps minimise the I/O pin count for the sensor. This 
register is activated using a ‘serial-in RO_SEL’ pin. The 
Decoder, as mentioned earlier, is designed to generate all the 
internal inputs/signals for the FSS and DSS RO based 
segments. It is noteworthy that all the RO pairs in each 
segment utilize the same internal signals generated by the 
Decoder, and it is not essential to generate the control signals 
for each RO pair. The operation of the Counter and Timer is 
the same as elaborated in section IV-A of this paper.  
 In order to achieve high detection and measurement 
accuracy, we, besides adopting the averaging strategy, also 
consider the selection strategy as depicted in the process flow 
in Fig. 17. The selection strategy implies finding a DSS RO 
that experiences maximum frequency degradation/delay and 
hence the ageing due to the NBTI mechanism. For this 
purpose, the DSS RO pair is compared with the FSS RO pairs 
even though they remain dormant during normal operations. 
It is, therefore, essential to find an FSS RO pair that is slower 
than the DSS RO pairs during the time ‘0’ to design a higher 
sensitivity sensor that enables the detection of hardware 
Trojan activity well before its onset. 
E. SENSOR AND HARDWARE TROJAN DETECTION 
SCHEME - TESTING AND ANALYSIS 
The correct verification of the effectiveness and sensitivity 
of threshold voltage based sensor for a hardware Trojan 
detection scheme is, therefore, critical. Consequent to the 
optimisation of sensor accuracy described in the above 
section, we implemented the improved sensor design (with 
additional RO segments) in a 28 nm FPGA technology node. 
The experiment was set up to provide and emulate the ISPS 
system environment onboard a naval vessel for realistic side-
channel measurements. A nominal supply voltage of 1.0V is 
provided from a benchtop power supply having basic voltage 
setting accuracy and voltage readback accuracy of 0.03%. 
With the enabling of heating elements (following the same 
phase -1 process with Negative bias ‘-1.2V’ and Tp ‘60⁰C’, 
as described in Section IV-A), the first set of readings 
(including threshold voltage, oscillation frequency/count, 
and corresponding signal delays) is taken at stabilised 
negative bias and primary thermal point, using DL850E 
ScopeCorder with sample rates up to 100 MS/s.  
 
Similarly, the experiments were conducted for the second 
and third phases of the scheme. Although the impact of PVs 
is minimal as the two sensor segments are placed very close 
to each other, we did, however, consider the impact of 
process variations on the detection sensitivity of the sensor 
in terms of percentage, as given in Table V.  
 These tests were repeated to establish the consistency of 
results and assure the robustness of the developed scheme. 
The synopsis of test results is given in Fig. 18 and  
Fig. 19 (a) – (f). The frequency difference of FSS and DSS 
‘fFD’ is represented along the x-axis, and the y-axis 
represents the frequency of occurrence/the number of test 
samples. Three different threshold voltage shift states ‘Vth1, 
Vth2, and Vth3’ corresponding to ‘fFD’ are representative of 
Vth distribution.  
 The green (Vth1=0%) distribution plot for ‘fFD’ is centred 
at 0 Hz. Whereas, the distributions in pink and blue 
corresponding to Vth2=40% and Vth3=70% respectively shift 
to the right. This is because the oscillation frequency/count 
of DSS slows down and results in a much larger change in 
frequency difference fFD. With no distinct overlap of 
distributions (at Vth1=0% and Vth2=40% and Vth3=70%), 
there is a strong indication of the presence of hardware 
Trojan. We can, therefore, positively detect the presence of 
hardware Trojans with Vth2=40% in an FPGA under test (28 
nm node). 
 In order to correctly estimate the percentage of false 
prediction, which is represented by the distributions’ overlap, 
we use Gaussian fit to determine the mean and variance of 
these distributions to calculate the overlapped area. At this 
stage, the process variations mentioned in Table V are taken 
into account. These variations being part and parcel of every 
silicon die, tend to affect electrical parameters invariably 
from die to die and intra-die as well. With PVa, we consider 
the probability of false prediction as negligible, and the same 
was observed during the test. The measured false prediction 
rates of the sensor relating to HT-free (θa ) and HT-infected 
(θb ) FPGA are elaborated in Table VI. These correspond to 
the process variations mentioned in Table V. It can be seen 
Intra-die 
Process 
Variations 
Parameter 
Transistor 
Length (L) % 
Oxide Thickness 
(Tox) % 
PVa 1.5 0.75 
PVb 2.5 1.5 
PVc 8 3.75 
TABLE VI.  False Prediction Rates (Probability of Error). 
 
TABLE V.  Intra-die process variations – Transistor length 
and oxide thickness. 
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that the false prediction rate with PVc is higher due to a 
significant difference in frequencies of the 28-nm FPGA 
under test with a higher percentage of process variations. As 
a result, the overlapped area between the two distributions 
grows significantly, thereby reflecting the increase in the 
probability of error (θ). We provided remediation by placing 
the two sensor segments very close to each other, as 
mentioned earlier. Besides, we increased the number of RO 
stages in both the segments from 9 to 31 and then observed 
any reduction in false prediction rate. A significantly lower 
false prediction rate is noted (at worst case PVc – 1.42% to 
0.11%) in the case of θb, and a similar trend is noted for θa 
(at worst case PVc – 1.37% to 0.13%). 
 The histogram plot giving the average frequency 
difference between the FSS and DSS sensor segments for the 
different number of pairs is shown in Fig. 20. We observe a 
substantial reduction in the spread of the distributions with 
the increase in the number of RO-pairs. The separation 
between the two distributions, however, remains the same. 
At this point, the threshold frequency     is measured for all 
the RO-pairs of the two segments and is found to be equal to 
2.5 MHz. It becomes crucial at this stage to analyse the 
changes in the mean (μ) and variance (  )  values of the 
frequency difference distribution of sensor segments to 
estimate the false prediction accuracy to assess any 
requirement to increase the number of RO-pairs for 
achieving a negligible false prediction rate. We took the 
FIGURE 19.  Distribution of frequency differences between FSS and DSS, fFD, with percentage shifts in threshold 
voltage in the presence of process variations PVa, PVb, and PVc and changing number of RO stages (9 and 31) in sensor 
segments. (a) PVa: 9-stage RO, (b) PVa: 31-stage RO, (c) PVb: 9-stage RO, (d) PVb: 31-stage RO, (e) PVc: 9-stage RO, 
(f) PVc: 31-stage RO. 
FIGURE 20.  Gaussian distribution of frequency difference ‘fFD’ 
at PVc of Vth-aware sensor with different number of RO-pairs.  
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measurements of the mean and variance of different 
distributions with different numbers of RO-pairs using the 
‘normfit MATLAB function’ to determine the accuracy of 
our process flows.  
 The measured values of the mean and variance are given 
in Table VII. The analysis revealed an error in the expected 
value when compared with the actual value (<0.4% for μ and 
<6% for σ). In light of this analysis, we created another 
histogram plot, as shown in Fig. 21(a)-(c), based on the 
frequency difference between the selected RO-pairs of FSS 
and DSS sensor segments to determine the most efficient and 
error-free hardware Trojan detection pair. We observe a 
significant overlap gap between the two distributions at time 
t=0 and time t. 
 Also, the increase in the separation between the 
distributions is found to be positively correlated to an 
increase in the number of RO-pairs. The threshold frequency 
   , in this case, is measured to be 2 MHz. We found the two 
RO-pairs combination to be the most appropriate with zero-
false prediction. The detection accuracy of the sensor is 
presented in Table VIII. The rate of false prediction is 
calculated as: 
 
   =    .                    ℎ     <                         × 100%                               (3) 
   =    .                    ℎ     >                         × 100%                      (4) 
 
 At different threshold voltage shift states, the impact on 
sensor accuracy with varying number of RO-pairs 
corresponding to each sensor segment is shown. As 
mentioned in previous paragraphs, we have implemented a 
maximum of 3 pairs of ROs each in two sensor segments, 
FSS and DSS. With a configuration of 2 RO-pairs, we can 
characterise the sensor to determine threshold frequency ‘fth’ 
corresponding to pre-Trojan trigger threshold voltage ‘Vth_ptt’ 
and provide a benchmark to compare the frequency 
differences of FSS and DSS ‘fFD’ with it for the detection of 
hardware Trojan, once triggered without any probability of 
error. It is essential to set the threshold frequency cautiously 
to ensure that the value of the probability of error of FPGAs 
falsely identified as HT-free (  ) is similar to the value of 
the probability of error of FPGAs falsely identified as HT-
infected (  ).  
F. AREA OVERHEAD ANALYSIS 
The implementation of a threshold voltage triggered 
hardware Trojan detection scheme is optimized to utilize 
minimum resources of 28 nm technology node FPGA. 
Accordingly, the area overhead analysis of both the infection 
and detection schemes is shown in Table IX. We 
No. of 
RO 
Pairs 
g0 (.) gt = 105 s(.) 
μ σ μ σ 
Est. Meas. Est. Meas. Est. Meas. Est. Meas. 
2 0.000 0.012 0.723 0.785 3.213 3.220 0.793 0.887 
4 0.000 -0.021 0.524 0.525 3.213 3.220 0.613 0.611 
6 0.000 0.001 0.419 0.420 3.213 3.201 0.522 0.538 
10 0.000 -0.008 0.400 0.401 3.213 3.242 0.401 0.402 
TABLE VII.  Mean and Variance Frequency Distribution of 
Threshold Voltage Aware Sensor. 
FIGURE 21. Histograms of frequency difference distribution fFD at PVc of Vth-aware sensor with different number of RO-pairs. 
(a) Optimization with 1RO-pair. (b) Optimization with 2 RO-pairs. (c) Optimization with 3 RO-pairs.  
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implemented IWLS 2005 benchmarks of various sizes from 
low to high to assess the area overhead - the ratio of the size 
versus area of the sensor with the size versus area of the 
benchmark. As is evident, when used with a  
31-stage sensor in HT detection scheme, the area overhead 
is approximately 1.25% for n = 2 (2 RO-pairs) for smaller 
sized benchmarks like i2c, spi, and b14. We observe that it 
does not impact the overall area of small as well as medium 
and larger designs, implemented for heavy systems like the 
system processor module of ISPS, in our case. On average, 
the overall area occupied by the HT-detection scheme is 
measured to be 125μm2, whereas the power consumption 
reads 3.8μW, which is considered compatible with the 
designs discussed in Section-II. 
 
V. MITIGATING THE IMPACT OF THRESHOLD 
VOLTAGE-TRIGGERED HARDWARE TROJAN 
The final proposition of FPGA security scheme (Fig.3) is the 
design and implementation of hardware Trojan mitigation 
strategy. We propose a circuit design technique, which 
endures threshold voltage-triggered hardware Trojans. The 
internal module structure and control process flow devised.  
for this purpose are depicted in Fig. 22 and Fig. 23 
respectively. For this scheme, we target the monitoring of 
drain current ‘Idd’ as a parameter that contributes to 
performance degradation as a result of shifts in threshold 
voltage. A mechanism is proposed whereby a change in the 
threshold voltage is sensed and a corresponding adjustment 
in Idd is made to compensate for current variations in critical 
circuit nodes implemented in FPGA. 
 The main elements added to form the mitigation scheme 
are the ‘Current Adjustment Module,’ ‘Reference Voltage 
Generator,’ and the ‘Transistor Width Scaling Module.’ 
IWLS 2005 benchmark ‘vga_lcd’ is used as a test circuit 
implemented in 28-nm FPGA to validate the HT mitigation 
scheme. It also includes the process of pinpointing the 
potential critical gates that experience frequency degradation 
due to the impact of NBTI through shifts in threshold voltage. 
The Current Adjustment Module (CAM) gauges the 
acceptable limits and ranges of shifts in threshold voltage, 
fanned out by the sensor (in our case, the Vth_ptt). If Vth_ptt 
(pre-trojan trigger threshold voltage) is out of the acceptable 
limit, the control signal is given to the Transistor Width 
Scaling Module (TWSM), which increases the transistor 
width to counter the excess threshold voltage shift and 
prevent the triggering of hardware Trojan. 
A. EARMARKING THE POTENTIAL CRITICAL GATES 
We implemented the IWLS 2005 benchmark ‘vga_lcd’ in 
28-nm FPGA using the Vivado design suite and applied the 
algorithm defined in [50] to pinpoint its potential critical 
gates using static timing analysis. We conclude that only 2.5% 
of the total gates are identifiable as the potential critical gates, 
based on the worst-case frequency/delay degradation. The 
worst-case degradation is set against the Vth_ptt. Accordingly, 
a reserve transistor width is allocated to the earmarked 
TABLE VIII.  Analysis of False Prediction – Improving Sensor 
Accuracy with RO-pairs scaling and selection process. 
TABLE IX.  Area overhead analysis of threshold voltage-aware 
sensor (SVth). 
FIGURE 22. Block diagram representation of FPGA security 
scheme highlighting hardware Trojan mitigation sub-scheme. 
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FIGURE 23.  The process flow of hardware Trojan Mitigation 
Scheme. 
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critical gates to increase ‘Idd’ and counter the impact of the 
increased threshold voltage. The details of the 
implementation are described later in section V-D. 
B. REFERENCE VOLTAGE GENERATOR 
The measurement of the threshold voltage is done using 
‘Threshold Voltage Meter’(Fig. 9). Although we have used 
the percentage frequency differences corresponding to 
specific threshold voltage shifts in the HT detection scheme, 
we consider it prudent to quantify the impact of shifts in 
threshold voltage due to NBTI, while devising HT mitigation 
scheme. In this regard, we propose the implementation of a 
‘Reference Voltage Generator’ comprising a resistive-based 
voltage divider. The schematic of the generator is shown in 
Fig. 24. While calculating the reference voltages, the effect 
of resistive tolerance is taken into account. Resultantly, for 
the threshold voltage shifts of 40% and 70%, for instance, we 
represent them correspondingly as Vref_40% and Vref_70 %. In 
order to determine the effect of resistive tolerance variations, 
we carried out Monte Carlo simulation, taking into account 
the process and environmental variations as well. A 
maximum change in reference voltage ΔVref of less than 4mV 
is observed at a worst-case resistive variation of ± 5%. 
Whereas at nominal (± 3% ) and best case (± 0.5%) 
variations, ΔVref of less than 2mV and 0.75mV respectively 
are noted. 
 
C. CURRENT ADJUSTMENT MODULE 
Since the shift in threshold voltage of a PMOS device results 
in the reduction of drain current and the subsequent slowing 
down of the circuit speed, it is possible to reverse or mitigate  
this phenomenon by increasing the drain current. In order to 
achieve this, a comparator circuit comprising current-mirror 
based differential amplifier is implemented as a current 
adjustment module. The schematic of this module is shown 
in Fig. 25. Here, the output of the HT detection scheme and  
the reference voltage generator drive the inputs of the current 
adjustment module. A control signal from the current  
 
adjustment module is provided to the TWSM module, which 
subsequently increases the width of the transistor to counter 
the frequency degradation/delay impact of the NBTI 
mechanism. 
 In order to check the operation-ability of this module, we 
induce a fractional change at the inverting and non-inverting 
inputs of the comparator, as shown in Fig. 26. When the 
voltage on the inverting terminal of the comparator is made 
higher as compared to its non-inverting terminal, the 
comparator switches to logic ‘0’ and vice versa. We 
considered the impact of process variations as well and found 
the comparator sensitive up to 1.5mV of variation between 
inverting and non-inverting terminals. 
D. TRANSISTOR WIDTH SCALING MODULE 
Increasing the transistor width to let more current pass 
through the transistor can be implemented as a 
countermeasure against the threshold voltage triggered 
hardware Trojans to mitigate the latency induced by the shift 
in threshold voltage [51]. However, designing transistor 
width increment as a one-time design rule makes it 
ineffective against the long-run online performance 
degradation caused by NBTI ageing mechanism [51]. Also, 
device upsizing could inflict constraints on the design 
specification during the design stage. Many design metrics, 
FIGURE 24.  Resistive voltage divider for Reference 
Voltage Generator (RVG). 
FIGURE 25.  A Comparator circuit with current-mirror based 
differential amplifier. 
V(+) V(-)
Output
0.00 V
0.05 V
0.15 V
0.25 V
0.35 V
0.45 V
0.55 V
0.65 V
0.75 V
0.85 V
0.95 V
460 mV 465 mV 470 mV 475 mV 480 mV 485 mV 490 mV455 mV
V (+)
V (-)
V (-)
V (+)
V (out)
V (+) =Non-inverting signal
V (-) = Inverting signal
Input
O
ut
pu
t
FIGURE 26.  Input / Output response of a comparator. 
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like impedance matching and Q point of V-I curve, may be 
affected, which may result in excess drain current values. It 
is for these reasons, we propose a hardware Trojan mitigation 
scheme that adjusts the width of transistors dynamically (i.e., 
during run-time) and named as ‘Online Transistor 
Dynamic Scaling (OTDS). We divide OTDS into two 
implementation phases as follows: 
1) DESIGN PHASE 
In the design phase, we define the dimensions of the 2% of 
identified critical gates of IWLS 2005 benchmark ‘vga_lcd’ 
in-line with its I/O functional specification. Additionally, we 
provide the threshold voltage compensation 
dimensions/sizing as a backup for the potential critical gates. 
As per the design, the dimensions of the transistor forming 
the critical gate remain fixed until it is sensitized by a 
significant NBTI impact on the design embedded in FPGA. 
2) DYNAMIC PHASE 
As mentioned in the above paragraphs, when threshold 
voltage begins to change (increase with NBTI), a runtime 
decision will be asserted to increase the width of the critical 
transistors. With an increase in transistor width, the device is 
supported with a corresponding increase in its drain current 
and hence, balances and mitigates the impact of threshold 
voltage shifts. 
 The concept is illustrated in Fig. 27. It shows an inverter 
having a PMOS double the size of its NMOS counterpart. 
Under the normal situation, the pull-up network possesses 
two unconnected parallel widths (2xW2 and 2xW3). 
Similarly, the pull-down network consists of two 
unconnected parallel widths (W2 and W3). We gated the 
additional PMOS widths, 2xW2 and 2xW3, using transistors 
Q1 and Q3, respectively. Similarly, the additional NMOS 
widths W2 and W3 are also gated using the transistors Q2 
and Q4 respectively. The transistors Q1 and Q2 are set to 
share the same triggering signal from node X whereas Q3 
and Q4 share the identical signal from node Y. Under the 
normal condition, defined as Vth < Vth_ptt, all these transistors 
remain dormant (‘Off State’) and are considered to be a unit 
sized transistors. As the threshold voltage is shifted (Vth ≥ 
Vth_ptt) with bias and temperature stressed NBTI, the OTDS 
technique tries to compensate its impact by selecting 
transistors of larger widths. At this stage, the reference 
voltage generator provides steps of percentage voltage 
corresponding to percentage shifts in threshold voltage. 
When an increase of 30% in the threshold voltage of the 
PMOS transistor is reached, the transistor width is 
incremented to counter the shift in threshold voltage to 
prevent HT triggering.  
 It is vital to have an accurate reference voltage step 
generation for effective mitigation of the increased threshold 
voltage and the frequency/delay degradation of the circuit 
application. For that purpose, we assume the reference 
voltages to be fixed and the run-time or dynamic state 
decision is made using the values of threshold voltage 
measured by the HT detection scheme sensor. During the 
experiment, we observe that as the threshold voltage rises by 
5%, the current adjustment module with a corresponding 
reference voltage (Vref) generates a signal X, which activates 
the transistors Q1 and Q2 and turns them ‘ON.’ At this point, 
the width of the Pull-Up network, shown in Fig. 27, increases 
by 2xW2 and so does the width of the Pull-Down network 
by W2. In the same way, at some instances of the time 
interval, the signal Y gets triggered with a specific reference 
voltage, which in turn, activates the transistors Q3 and Q4, 
having widths as shown in Fig. 27. This leaves the Pull-Up 
and Pull-Down networks with improved speed and stability.  
 
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND OPTIMIZATION OF 
HARDWARE TROJAN MITIGATION SCHEME 
It is well established that the drain current ‘Idd’ and the 
response time of a MOSFET are directly proportional to its 
width. Therefore, increasing the transistor’s width will 
subsequently increase the drain current as well as its 
response time. So, in order to double the transistor width, we 
may use an equal width transistor to widen the MOSFET by 
sharing the drain and source terminals between MOSFETs.  
It also helps in minimising the layout area. 
 Before deciding the extent of increasing the width of the 
transistor to reverse current reduction due to NBTI, we 
quantify the reduction in drain current ‘Idd’. Accordingly, we 
measure ‘Idd’ at 0%, 10%, 30%, 60%, and 90% of shift in Vth. 
The measurement results are listed in Table X. Based upon 
these measurements, a width-based parametric analysis of 
the PMOS transistor is undertaken to make a correct 
assessment of the extent of its width increment required to 
reverse ‘Idd’ reduction, corresponding to percentage shifts in 
Vth. This analysis is enabled by the circuitry shown in Fig. 
28. As can be seen, we kept the gate and source voltages of 
the PMOS transistor constant at -1V and 0V, respectively 
and noted the variation in width (W) of the transistor. The 
results are shown in Fig. 29. It is evident that for a given gate 
TABLE X.  Measured values – PMOS Idd   reduction with 
increase in Vth. 
FIGURE 27.  Online Transistor Dynamic Scaling using Pull-
up and Pull-down networks.  
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and source voltages, the drain current increases two-fold as 
the width of the PMOS device is doubled. So, accordingly, 
we come up with the requisite percentage of width increment, 
which is added in parallel for each value of shift in threshold 
voltage to increase the transistor’s width and the current flow 
through it. The implementation of this scheme is elaborated 
in Fig. 30. 
 We employ the unit size transistor as a switch to manage 
and control the connectivity of a transistor width for 
compensation. As seen in Fig. 30, Q1 represents the critical 
gate, and Q2, Q3, and Q4 are the widths reserved to 
compensate for the reduction of ‘Idd’ due to percentage Vth 
shifts. As mentioned earlier, the sizes of Q2, Q3, Q4, and Q5 
are defined at the design phase. The same are given in Table 
XI. 
 In order to validate the mitigation scheme, the circuitry 
in Fig. 30 is applied to a flip flop with true single-phase 
clocking function. We measure the rise and fall times of the 
flip flop as they change with changes in the threshold voltage. 
The results show an increase in the rise and fall times with 
an increase in Vth shifts. The exact values are covered in 
Table XII. We observe that as a result of this increase, 
momentary state transitions occur in FSM, which may lead 
to changing the output state. Also, we note that as the 
duration of this output state is extended, it gets latched and 
may result in the activation of malicious and stealthy 
hardware Trojan. This, however, is prevented by increasing 
the device width and resultantly, the triggering signal for the 
Trojan is silenced. 
 In a nutshell, adding extra reserve width for Pull-Up and 
Pull-Down network in the design phase provides a viable 
mitigation technique, which increases the transistor width 
dynamically during the run-time.  
 
VII. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH CONTEMPORARY 
MITIGATION TECHNIQUES 
We have presented a holistic FPGA security scheme to detect 
and mitigate the ingress of threshold voltage triggered 
hardware Trojans in its fabric. In doing so, we have designed, 
implemented, and validated HT-infection, HT-detection, and 
HT-mitigation schemes, with novel sensing and monitoring 
elements. We have highlighted its significance in the ship-
defence environment by providing a threat scenario/model 
based on an ‘Integrated Self-Protection System (ISPS).’ This 
is a unique effort that puts forth an integrated approach 
towards visualising and addressing a probable hardware 
Trojan presence in a security-sensitive and mission-critical 
defence system with accurate and resource-efficient 
detection and mitigation circuitry in a 28 nm technology 
node based FPGA. 
 As discussed in section II, a significant amount of 
research work has been undertaken to develop effective 
methods and circuits. In this section, we make a comparative 
analysis of our work with other existing methods for the 
mitigation of the NBTI effect in integrated circuits. For 
instance, in [52], the adaptive clock scheme entails 
increasing the clock time to address the worst-case 
performance (in terms of signal path time delays) 
degradation due to NBTI. This scheme is, however, 
hardware-intensive with a high area overhead. Also, it 
degrades the device performance as a result of time guard 
banding. Another technique [36] implies the replacement of 
FIGURE 30.  Threshold voltage-triggered hardware 
Trojan mitigation circuitry of the ‘HT-Mitigation 
TABLE XI.   Measured values – width increment (Fanout-4) 
with shifts in Vth . 
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FIGURE 28.  Circuitry for transistor width parametric 
analysis.  
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aged gates to reverse delay degradation but, again, it results 
in high area overhead. Our work, on the contrary, addresses 
performance degradation by changing the transistor width 
dynamically. This entails low area overhead and enhanced 
device performance.  
 In another scheme [53], device ageing due to NBTI is 
countered through standard-cell sensor-facilitated 
measurement of frequency degradation. It is followed by 
inducing additional timing margin for the critical path to 
prevent device failure due to continued ageing. However, the 
provision of redundancy in terms of extra timing margin is 
not always valid. Moreover, such kind of schemes is 
resource-intensive with increased area overheads–an 
undesired feature in modern technology nodes. 
 Table XIII summarises the analysis in terms of efficiency 
with respect to area overhead and power consumption. We 
find the HT-mitigation component of our FPGA security 
scheme more resource-efficient with reduced power 
consumption. It augments the device performance by zeroing 
the impact of shifts in threshold voltage through responsive 
and dynamic scaling of transistor width rather than the 
replacement of the gate/transistor. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The miniaturised form factor of modern FPGAs provides 
enhanced performance as compared to their predecessors. 
However, high-temperature stresses coupled with longer 
heat dissipation paths may cause undesired stochastic 
variations like signal delays. Primarily, this is attributable to 
the negative bias temperature instability (NBTI) ageing 
mechanism that comes into play as a result of elevated 
temperature and negative bias stress conditions.  
Consequently, the threshold voltage increases,  which in turn, 
leads to reduced drain current and delay degradation. 
 Keeping the aforementioned in perspective, we have 
investigated the impact of threshold voltage shifts due to the 
degradation mechanism of NBTI in a 28 nm technology node 
and constructed an FPGA security scheme around it to 
counter potential hardware Trojan (HT) threats. The 
development of a threat scenario/model encompassing a 
naval warship’s integrated self-protection system (ISPS), 
with its processor module in focus, reinforces the need for a 
holistic approach to hardware Trojan threats. We have shown 
how a rogue element in a design house can make use of 
knowledge about the shifts in threshold voltage of a PMOS 
transistor to design and implement a stealthy hardware 
Trojan scheme comprising heating elements, threshold 
voltage meter, and the Trojan circuit. The area and power 
consumption for this scheme are kept as low as 50μm2 and 
1.05μW for NAND2 and 75μm2 and 1.25μW for TSPC, with 
the hardware Trojans triggering at 40% and 50% of the shift 
in threshold voltages, respectively. It results in the total 
collapse of the circuit functionality, thereby confirming the 
paralysing effect it can have on the ISPS system capability 
of a warship. Acting as a defender, we have created hardware 
Trojan detection and mitigation schemes as an integral part 
of the overall FPGA security scheme. The HT-detection 
scheme is composed of a highly sensitive (100 KHz/0.5 mV) 
ring oscillator pair-based sensor. It measures frequency 
degradation in a dynamic sensor segment (DSS) RO pair 
equivalent to the shifts in threshold voltage and compares it 
with the fixed sensor segment (FSS). The sensor is tested and 
calibrated to detect frequency degradation at the pre-Trojan 
Trigger threshold voltage ‘Vth_ptt’ and Trojan Trigger 
threshold voltage ‘Vth_tt.’ The detection and measurement 
accuracy is achieved by reducing the false prediction rate to  
zero. Area overhead of 125μm2 and compatible power 
consumption of 3.8μW are noted for the HT-detection 
scheme.  
 The final part of our FPGA security scheme is HT-
mitigation by online transistor dynamic scaling (OTDS). 
Here, we leverage the reduction in drain current with an 
increase in threshold voltage to dynamically adjust the 
transistor width and reverse the HT triggering process. Post 
parametric analysis of the changes in the transistor width, we 
conclude that increasing the transistor width improves its 
drain current flow, which in turn, helps maintain the 
performance of the FPGA and avoid HT triggering. We
Mitigation Method Area Utilization  
(unit sq.) 
 
Area Difference Power Consumption 
(μW) 
Power Consumption 
Difference 
Omana et al [52] 
Wang et al. [53] 
Bowman et al. [54] 
Vazquez et al. [55] 
Mintarno et al. [56] 
Cao et al. [57] 
Khatib et al. [58] 
Proposed 
98 
90 
86 
78 
75 
63 
65 
52 
(-) 47 % 
(-) 43 % 
(-) 40 % 
(-) 34 % 
(-) 31 %  
(-) 17 % 
         (-) 20 % 
- 
16.2 
17.5 
15.0 
15.9 
15.8 
15.7 
17.2 
5.5 
(-) 66 % 
(-) 68 % 
(-) 63 % 
(-) 65 % 
(-) 65 %  
(-) 64 % 
(-) 68 % 
- 
TABLE XII.  Timing delays in TSPC due to Vth-triggered 
hardware Trojan payload. 
TABLE XIII.  Area and Power consumption comparison of the proposed Threshold Voltage (Vth) -shift based HT Mitigation 
Scheme. 
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correlated and back annotated the requisite 
increment/decrement in the transistor width to compensate 
for the drain current loss due to shifts in threshold voltage. 
Accordingly, a range of transistor widths that compensates 
for the reduction in drain current has been determined in the 
FPGA under test. This HT-mitigation scheme occupies an 
area of 150μm2 with power consumption at 5.5 μW.  
 The whole FPGA security scheme is built on changes in 
the threshold voltage of the PMOS transistor. It provides a 
unique and integrated strategy for thwarting the probable 
infection of threshold voltage-triggered hardware Trojans in 
advanced re-programmable devices used in security-critical 
defence systems. In the future, we intend to: 1) study the 
impact of PBTI in NMOS transistors in conjunction with 
NBTI and design PBTI based hardware Trojan, 2) extend the 
scope of FPGA security scheme validation to more complex 
applications, 3) investigate the health of reprogrammable 
devices under the influence of such hardware Trojans, and 4) 
devise AI techniques to provide accurate FPGA prognostics. 
APPENDIX A  
IMPROVING THE HARDWARE TROJAN DETECTABILITY 
Keeping the patterns of false prediction in perspective, we 
consider improving the proposed sensor’s detection 
sensitivity by adding two additional pairs of ROs to each of 
the sensor segment (Fixed and Dynamic). The frequencies of 
all these pairs of RO segments are measured consecutively, 
during different thermal cycles. Subsequently, the average of 
FSS (Fixed Sensor Segment) and DSS (Dynamic Sensor 
Segment) frequencies is calculated to determine the presence 
of malicious hardware Trojan.  
1) SPREAD REDUCTION BY AVERAGING METHOD 
Assuming there is n number of ROs in the fixed and dynamic 
sensor segments, their respective frequencies can then be 
considered as random variables and denoted by a1, a2, …., an 
and b1, b2,....., bn, respectively. as the distribution of g0(ffd ) 
depends upon the frequency differences of both the fixed and 
dynamic sensor segments; we can derive the following 
equation: 
 
  Xi = Ai - Bi   (5) 
 
 In this equation, Xis is Gaussian, as both the Ais  and Bis 
are Gaussian. We further assume the variables A and B to 
have the same mean and variance, as all the RO segments 
undergo the same process variations. The aim is to determine 
the mean and variance of a newly formed random variable 
Zn. Mathematically, this can be represented as follows: 
            = 1    Ai −  1    Bi  
   
  
   
                                (6) 
                     = 1
 
 (Ai − Bi) = 1
 
        
   
                  
   
(7) 
 The resultant random variable      will be, therefore, 
Gaussian as all the Xis are Gaussian. Based on this, the mean 
and variance are expressed in the following mathematical 
form: 
 
 [   ] =  [ 1       ]  
   
=  1
 
  E      
 
     
                           =  n    
 
 =                                           (8) 
   (   ) =      1       
     
 
                   =           
 
  
   
  
  =  1
  
      (   ) 
     
 +  1
  
       (
     
   ,   )          (9) 
 
In the above equations,  [   ] is the expected value of the 
random variable   - equal to the mean of a Gaussian random 
variable. Whereas    (   ) represents the variance of the 
random variable     and        ,      is the covariance 
between the random variables          . In this 
mathematical model, we assume the frequencies of all the 
RO segments to be independent so that the random variables 
  ,    , … . .     also become independent. It, therefore, 
results in all the covariances in (9) becoming zero.  
   (   )   =  1         (   ) =           
     
  =    
 
      (10) 
 Keeping the above equation (9) in view, the mean (μ) and 
the standard deviation (σ) of    can be derived as follows: 
 
       =      (11) 
 
       =   √    (12) 
 As can be seen in (8) and (11), the mean of the average 
difference     remains unchanged when compared with each 
  . On the other hand, the variance of    is dependent on √ . 
A similar derivation is carried out to estimate the resultant 
mean and variance for the distribution at time t, gt(fFD ). We, 
therefore, infer that the overlapping area between the two 
distributions can be reduced to an almost negligible amount 
by adding additional RO pairs to both the fixed and dynamic 
segments, as is evident from Fig. 15(b). 
APPENDIX B 
DETERMINING MAXIMUM FREQUENCY DEGRADATION 
An accurate and precise capturing of frequency degradation 
in ring oscillators is key to the correct and authentic 
assessment of hardware Trojan’s triggering, its impact, and 
a reliable measure of the sensor’s sensitivity. We, therefore, 
experimented to determine the maximum frequency 
degradation experienced by DSS RO pairs when negative 
bias and elevated temperatures are applied as per the 
hardware Trojan insertion scheme described in section III 
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and coarse as well as fine stretching operations (stress-time) 
used in [59] to minimise measurement errors. We observe 
how the frequency degradation (with subsequent delays and 
ageing), δf, changes with the percentage frequency 
differences at varying threshold voltages. A total of 10K 
samples were taken at each thermal (60, 90, and 125⁰C) and 
negative bias (-1.2V, -1.4V, and -2.0V) points. The scatter 
plot of frequency degradation δf against frequency 
difference  ft DSS at time t is shown in Fig. 18, where  ft DSS 
= (ft(-2.0V) - ft(-1.4V) - ft(-1.2V)) / ft(-1.2V). As is evident, ft(-2.0V),  ft(-
1.4V), and ft(-1.2V) are the frequencies of DSS RO pairs that are 
exposed to negative bias and increasing temperature stresses. 
A positive correlation ( ) for frequency degradation and 
normalised frequency differences is observed that indicates 
the ageing and delay degradation in this specific threshold 
voltage triggered hardware Trojan environment. Based on 
this experimental observation, we undertook mathematical 
analysis to determine the relationship that could enhance 
sensor accuracy defined by the interdependence of 
temperature, threshold voltage, oscillation count/frequency, 
and ageing/delays variability.  
 As the DSS RO pairs are subjected to temperature and 
threshold voltage variations at time t, the oscillation 
count/frequency ft DSS begins to fall. It becomes lower than 
the frequency f0 DSS at time 0. This frequency degradation    
can, then, be given as: 
 
   =         −                                                                  (13) 
 
 With the application of negative bias at three different 
values in time 0, the percentage frequency difference is 
resultantly calculated as: 
 
         =        ,     –       ,     –       ,           ,        (14) 
 
 Where,      >      >     . As there exists a positive 
correlation between    and         , we aim at identifying 
DSS RO pair that experiences a maximum frequency 
degradation relative to percentage frequency differences at 
the afore-mentioned negative bias and temperature stress 
values, mathematically: 
 
     
 
←                    (15) 
 
 Then, the frequency degradation for the sensor can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
     =  ∆   − ∆         (16) 
 where, 
  ∆   =           –               (17) 
 
 We also consider the impact process variations (PVs) 
could have on frequency (delay/ageing) degradation    and 
the percentage frequency difference       . With the 
positive correlation between the two, it is possible to have an 
optimal estimate     for   . Minimum mean-square error 
(MMSE) estimator, for instance, provides versatility to 
achieve reduced mean square error and make more realistic 
estimates [60]. The DSS RO degradation is, therefore, 
expressed using the minimum mean-square error (MMSE) 
estimator, as follows: 
 
       =   
      
      
  (      −        ) + μ        (18) 
 where    defines the correlation between frequency 
degradation in dynamic sensor segment (      )  and 
percentage frequency difference (     );          and 
        connotate the standard deviations for        and 
      respectively. Whereas, μ      and        represent 
the mean for       and       respectively.  
 The MMSE estimator for the overall sensor degradation 
(  ), as opposed to a particular sensor segment, can now be 
expressed as follows: 
 
     =  ∆    −  ∆    =          −           −          −           
 
         = −          −           +          −                       (19) 
 
 Since, the frequency degradation is assumed to be 
negligible in case of fixed sensor segment RO pairs,         =
          , the above equation can be written as:  
 
         =          −          
 
=        =   
      
      
  (      −        ) + μ        (20) 
 
 The above relation implies that with   being positive, the 
higher percentage frequency difference between the FSS and 
DSS RO pairs will, in turn, maximise the sensor frequency 
(and subsequent delay/ageing) degradation. It is represented 
by the separation between two distributions at t = 0 and t = t. 
This further implies that in the sensor with more RO pairs to 
select from, the one with the maximum percentage frequency 
difference within DSS RO pairs at t = 0 must be selected. 
This results in maximising the distance between the two 
distributions of frequency difference and minimising the 
probability of false prediction, as shown in Fig. 15(a).  
 Keeping in view the above mathematical derivations and 
‘selection strategy’(as delineated in process flow - Fig. 17), 
the detectability of hardware Trojan by the sensor is set for 
optimisation. Accordingly, we define the process variations 
based on transistor length (L) and oxide thickness (Tox), as 
given in Table V and choose ‘PVc’ class of process 
variations as an extreme (worst) case to determine the pre-
trigger value of frequency degradation, relative to percentage 
shift in the threshold voltage. Also, the two sensor segments 
(FSS and DSS) are implemented close to each other to 
eliminate the impact of undefined environmental variations 
upon measurements and the accuracy of detection. 
 The process flow (Fig. 17) targets the selection of the best 
(with maximum frequency degradation) FSS and DSS RO-
pair by, initially, selecting all the six RO-pairs and then 
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capturing their frequencies. These frequencies are stored by 
two vectors, defined as  ⃑     = [      ,       ,      ]  and 
 ⃑    =  [     ,      ,      ] and all the frequency 
differences are stored in a matrix defined as, ∆  =  ∆       , 
where ∆    =   ⃑   ( ) −   ⃑   ( ), ∀( ,  ). If ∆     is positive, 
the fixed and dynamic RO-pair with minimum ∆     is 
selected. Otherwise, only negative ∆    values are taken to 
update ∆  . In such a condition, the resulting distribution 
  ´(. ) presents a significantly reduced spread, as is evident in 
Fig. 15(c). 
 However, at time t, the distribution   (. ) must be shifted 
to the right to increase    even further. In such a condition, 
DSS RO is selected with maximum       ⃗    ( )  
 
                 =       ,     ( ) –       ,     ( ) –       ,     ( )
      ,     ( )     (21) 
 
 Whereas, the corresponding FSS RO with maximum ∆    
is selected to minimise the spread of both distributions,   ´(. ) 
and   (. ) . Once the optimal RO pair is selected, the 
frequency difference ∆     is then stored to form the 
distribution   ´(. ) . The threshold frequency      is finally 
calculated, to be referred to for the detection of hardware 
Trojan by comparing it with the frequency differences of 
FSS and DSS RO segments implemented in FPGA under 
authentication. 
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